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Approximately one fourth of global emissions are embodied in international trade and a signiﬁcant
portion ﬂows from non-carbon-priced to carbon-priced economies. Border carbon adjustments (BCAs)
ﬁgure prominently as instruments to address concerns arising from unilateral climate policy. Estimating
the volume of emissions that could be potentially taxed under a BCA scheme has received little attention
until now. This paper examines how a number of issues involved in the implementation of BCAs can
affect their ability to cover emissions embodied in trade and thus address carbon leakage. These issues
range from ensuring compliance with trade provisions and assumptions on the carbon intensity of im-
ports, to determining which countries are included and whether intermediate and ﬁnal demand are
considered. Here we show that the volume of CO2 captured by a scheme that involved all Annex B
countries could be signiﬁcantly reduced due to these issues, particularly by trade provisions, such as the
principle of ‘best available technology’ (BAT). As a consequence, the tariff burdens faced by non-Annex B
parties could dwindle considerably. These ﬁndings have important policy implications, as they question
the effectiveness and practicalities of BCAs to reduce carbon leakage and alleviate competitiveness
concerns, adding further arguments against their implementation.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Previous studies have focused on estimating the amount of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are generated during the
production of goods and services destined to be traded inter-
nationally (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Kainuma et al., 2000; Peters
and Hertwich, 2008; Peters et al., 2011). One consistent ﬁnding in
this literature is that industrialised nations (i.e. Annex B) tend to
import more emissions embodied in the foreign-made products
that they consume than those they export, consequently becoming
net-importers (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Net emissions trans-
fers from non-carbon-priced to carbon-priced economies viar Ltd. This is an open access article
ai),international trade have increased by a factor of 4 during the last
two decades, from 0.4 Gt in 1990 to 1.6 Gt of CO2 in 2008 (Peters
et al., 2011). Some authors consider that these growing transfers
undermine mitigation commitments, since it can be argued from
this perspective that emissions reductions in Annex B countries
are in fact lower than what is speciﬁed in their national emissions
inventories (Kanemoto et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2011).
Net emissions transfers constitute a phenomenon that has been
labelled as ‘demand-driven’ carbon leakage, in order to differ-
entiate it from its other variant, better known as ‘policy-induced’
leakage (Peters, 2010). The latter can be deﬁned as the increase of
emissions in countries with no abatement obligations due to cli-
mate policy implemented in nations subject to binding targets
(Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Paltsev, 2001). The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides a more general
deﬁnition, stating that carbon leakage relates to “phenomenaunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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isdiction/sector associated with the implementation of mitigation
policy is offset to some degree by an increase outside the jurisdiction/
sector through induced changes in consumption, production, prices,
land use and/or trade across the jurisdictions/sectors” (Allwood et al.,
2014; p. 1265). Existing studies have been unable to reveal
meaningful empirical evidence of ‘policy-induced’ carbon leakage
(Reinaud, 2008; Sartor, 2012), whereas the existence of ‘demand-
driven’ leakage is clearly reﬂected on the signiﬁcant rise of net
emissions transfers and constitutes an important matter.
It is believed that carbon leakage is associated with the loss of
competitiveness of trade-exposed and carbon-intensive industries
located in nations subject to costly carbon restrictions with respect
to similar foreign industries situated in countries not constrained
by climate policy (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; van Asselt and Brewer,
2010). In order to alleviate carbon leakage and competitiveness
concerns, it has been argued that emission pricing should be ex-
tended unilaterally to cover imported goods and services by ap-
plying border carbon adjustments (BCAs) (Helm et al., 2012; Ismer
and Neuhoff, 2007; Lockwood and Whalley, 2010; Stiglitz, 2006).
Applying a price on the carbon content of imported goods at the
border, in this manner, could contribute to levelling the playing
ﬁeld between carbon-priced and non-carbon-priced economies.
The effectiveness of BCAs is a contested issue. Several studies
suggest that these instruments can contribute to ameliorate the
risk of carbon leakage (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Kuik and Hofkes,
2010). Other examinations, however, have been more critical,
highlighting the major drawbacks of these policy tools (Jakob
et al., 2014). This paper, in this sense, aims to shed light on the
matter by quantifying the volume of emissions that could be ac-
tually levied by BCAs, an aspect that has not received the proper
attention in the literature. For this purpose, we take into account
issues involved in BCA implementation related to trade provisions,
carbon intensity of products and sectoral and country coverage.
We then examine how these issues inﬂuence the tariff burdens
faced by non-carbon-priced economies. This allows assessing the
ability of BCAs to reduce leakage and their true contribution to
climate policy.
The analysis involves the hypothetical case of a BCA scheme
implemented by Annex B nations, given that this country grouping
is suitable to illustrate the paper's objectives. However, we ac-
knowledge that this particular group constitutes one of many
potential scenarios. This is relevant given the introduction of other
emissions trading schemes (ETS), apart from the Kyoto Protocol
and the European Union ETS, such as the recent launch of South
Korea's cap-and-trade programme, the ﬁrst to be in operation in
Asia, as well as the progress made towards setting up a Chinese
trading system. The implications for our analysis of considering
new abatement schemes in Non-Annex B countries are discussed
later in the paper.
This research adds to the literature by showing that some as-
pects related to BCA implementation, particularly trade provisions,
substantially reduce the volume of emissions along the supply
chain that could be potentially taxed and contribute to seriously
diminish the tariff burdens faced by exporting economies. The
results offered in this paper thus conﬁrm other existing studies in
the sense that the beneﬁts generated by BCAs would be small,
while its implementation could prove to be extremely costly and
difﬁcult (Izard et al., 2010; Liu, 2015; McKibbin et al., 2008;
Winchester et al., 2011). The ﬁndings essentially cast doubts on the
practicality and effectiveness of these policy tools. This is relevant,
as there has been an increasing discussion about adopting BCAs in
some Annex B countries and other industrialised economies. The
US represents a particularly pertinent example, since it has ex-
plicitly stated that any future climate legislation involving reduc-
tion targets would contain a provision for BCAs to protect itsnational industries. However, given their ineffectiveness, we argue
that other options should be sought. The literature offers examples
of alternative measures to address leakage and competitiveness
concerns that could be more effective to support major polluting
economies to intensify their mitigation actions, rather than to
unilaterally penalise them for their inaction (Böhringer et al., 2012;
Droege, 2011; Jakob et al., 2014). Some of these examples are
presented later in the paper when we address the policy
implications.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides addi-
tional background on BCAs and clariﬁes some conceptual aspects
that are adopted in the analysis. Section 3 describes the method
and data used. The empirical results are presented in Section 4,
which are then discussed in Section 5. Section 6 offers the con-
clusions derived from the study, as well as the policy implications.2. BCAs: background and conceptual approach
As has been mentioned, this section succinctly covers some key
background information about BCAs and clariﬁes the conceptual
approach followed in the analysis. It addresses aspects such as the
objectives, implementation, compatibility with trade law, and ef-
ﬁciency of BCAs.
2.1. The objectives of BCAs
Advocates of BCAs generally regard them as a trade instrument
to internalise a global externality (Markusen, 1975). The literature,
however, identiﬁes more speciﬁc objectives that can be pursued by
implementing BCAs, such as ensuring an effective carbon price
domestically, creating incentives to improve carbon efﬁciency
among foreign producers, or from the standpoint of a coercion
strategy to penalise free-riders (i.e. non-carbon-abating econo-
mies) and persuade them to assume legally binding targets
(Neuhoff, 2011).
If carbon prices are asymmetrical among members of a region
bound by carbon constraints, applying BCAs to fellow trade part-
ners within the international agreement can ensure an efﬁcient
domestic price, given that adequate carbon equalisation measures
are in place (e.g. assuming average carbon intensity, best available
technology, etc.). BCAs can also encourage emissions reductions
abroad by motivating foreign producers outside the scheme to
become more carbon efﬁcient, or even to punish non-participation
in abatement efforts (Barrett, 1997; Irfanoglu et al., 2015; Less-
mann et al., 2009; Li and Zhang, 2012; Winchester et al., 2011).
However, it has been suggested that carbon equalisation can hin-
der the achievement of these two last objectives (Neuhoff, 2011).
Depending on the adjustment rate after equalisation, BCAs can
contribute to either shift carbon-intensive production to non-ex-
ports sectors in the producing country, or even risk blocking future
involvement from non-participating nations in climate policy ne-
gotiations. In this paper, we argue that carbon equalisation can
signiﬁcantly reduce the tariff rates faced by exporting nations, thus
affecting the effectiveness of BCAs. In our analysis, we assume that
there is a homogeneous carbon price among the participants of
the BCA scheme (and additionally that there is no internal leak-
age), which seeks not only to improve carbon efﬁciency outside
the region (i.e. reduce net emissions transfers), but also serve as a
coercive tool.
When regarded as an instrument of persuasion, BCAs have
been often considered as a potential ‘game changer’ in deadlocked
international climate negotiations (Helm et al., 2012). Developing
nations, however, have historically experienced border adjust-
ments being imposed against them, with adverse effects on their
development efforts. Consequently, they generally oppose to their
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for protectionism by industrialised economies and go against the
spirit of free trade (Holmes et al., 2011; Kaufmann and Weber,
2011). Moreover, developing economies tend to contest BCAs, as-
serting that they conﬂict with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities’. According to this perspective,
the developing world should carry less onerous abatement ob-
ligations and, consequently, should not be subject to additional
mitigation costs via BCAs (Davidson Ladly, 2012). Along these lines,
it is commonly stated that BCAs downplay the environmental and
social injustices that arise from uneven development (Eckersley,
2010; Steininger et al., 2014). For this reason, authors such as
Neuhoff (2011) propose that in the case of implementing BCAs, it
should be done under close international cooperation with the
purpose of generating trust and understanding among parties
about the desired outcomes delivered by the scheme.
2.2. Implementation of BCAs
Regarding the implementation of BCAs, they can be applied
from a priced-based (e.g. tariff, tax) or a quantity-based approach
(e.g. allowances) (Neuhoff, 2011). In the ﬁrst case, importers are
required to pay at the border a tax or tariff that is equal to the
current carbon tax or price multiplied by the carbon embodied in
the imported good and then divided by its value. In the latter,
importers acquire allowances in the market or through an auction
to cover for the carbon embodied in the imports, while exporters
would be exempted from surrendering allowances. Monjon and
Quirion (2010) suggest that it makes sense to follow the quantity-
based approach in systems that already have a trading scheme.
The manner in which emissions allowances are allocated to
domestic emitters is also an important element that is essential in
the design of BCA schemes. To date, existing emissions trading
programmes have provided most allowances for free. The rationale
behind this action responds mainly to political reasons, as this
method can ameliorate adverse costs (e.g. production, employ-
ment, etc.) in polluting sectors. Since the allowances are not paid
for, allocating allowances freely ultimately represents a subsidy to
production or investment and, as a result, polluters earn a proﬁt
(Böhringer and Lange, 2005). As follows, free allocation has also
been considered as a potential option to address risk of carbon
leakage (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a). However, it has been re-
cognised that this method is less efﬁcient than BCAs (Monjon and
Quirion, 2011b) and can create undesired distortions (Neuhoff,
2011). These range from distributional impacts, since costs are
shifted to the consumer, to the creation of perverse incentives if
free allowances are allocated repeatedly over time. Monjon and
Quirion (2010) assert that applying BCAs under free allocation
would be difﬁcult to justify, as assigning free allowances to foreign
producers would be politically unlikely. The authors, however,
believe that a better solution is to combine BCAs with a full auc-
tioning of allowances. This idea is supported by Neuhoff (2011)
and Sato et al. (2015), who suggest that this combination would
allow countries to pursue ambitious carbon pricing without
creating distortions.
The selection of a particular allocation method inﬂuences the
carbon price. Nevertheless, in this paper we do not model a par-
ticular method for allocating allowances nor its price effects. We
argue that issues involved in BCA implementation, related to trade
provisions, assumptions on the carbon intensity of products and
sectoral and country coverage (explained in detail in Section 4),
seriously affect the volume of emissions captured by the scheme
irrespective of how allowances are allocated or how the domestic
carbon price is determined. Here we assume that allowances are
allocated for free, but assume that BCAs are applied in the form of
tariffs. We use an illustrative carbon price of $50 USD per ton,which has been suggested as a reasonable target for highly-de-
veloped economies in the short term in order to elucidate our
argument (Atkinson et al., 2011).
2.3. Compatibility with trade law
Numerous efforts have been made to examine the legal aspects
behind BCAs and their compatibility with World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) law (Frankel, 2005; Goh, 2004; Kaufmann and Weber,
2011). Some authors maintain that BCAs are not necessarily in
violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which represents the basis of the WTO framework (Biermann and
Brohm, 2004; Holmes et al., 2011; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b;
Sheldon, 2011). GATT holds a provision of non-discrimination be-
tween foreign and domestic ‘like’ products. Members of the WTO
are not allowed to restrict imports of ‘like’ products on grounds of
environmental impact, such as higher embodied emissions. Ex-
emptions exist, with the protection of global resources being sti-
pulated in Article XX of GATT. Hence, the potential implementa-
tion of BCA schemes would mainly hinge on whether they are
designed in a manner that avoids being challenged under WTO
law. Equalisation measures, in this respect, can ensure that the
import of ‘like’ goods receives a fair and similar treatment than
domestic products. This requires not taxing them in excess of the
domestic rates even if their carbon content is larger (Monjon and
Quirion, 2011b). This implies, for example, the application of the
principle of ‘best available technology’ (BAT), according to which
imports are supposed to have been manufactured with at least the
best technique existent in the country or region of consumption
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).
The inﬂuence of trade regulations, such as BAT, on the effec-
tiveness of BCAs to address leakage and competitiveness concerns
has received little attention and the evidence is inconclusive. Some
studies have suggested that leakage is not necessarily increased by
BAT (Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b).
Other authors have indicated that when border tariffs are based on
the carbon content in domestic production, rather than in imports,
BCAs would broadly address the competitiveness concerns of
producers in consuming nations without seriously damaging ex-
porting countries (Mattoo et al., 2009). Others have intuitively
expressed that BAT would contribute negatively to global emis-
sions reductions (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010). In this paper we ex-
amine the effects of BAT and offer more decisive evidence, illus-
trating that its application could signiﬁcantly limit the scope and
effectiveness of BCAs to ameliorate risk of leakage.
2.4. Efﬁciency of BCAs
Several modelling studies suggest that BCAs could address
competitiveness concerns by discouraging the relocation of in-
dustries to regions with laxer climate policies and overall by re-
ducing net emissions transfers (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Kuik and
Hofkes, 2010; McKibbin et al., 2008; Winchester, 2012; Winchester
et al., 2011). However, reviews of different models have found that
the decrease in carbon leakage would be moderate (Böhringer
et al., 2012; Branger and Quirion, 2014). It is worth noting, none-
theless, that modelling efforts mainly involve the use of compu-
table general equilibrium (CGE) models, which can produce a wide
range of leakage rates, depending on the level of sectoral and
country aggregation (see: Caron, 2012) and to different assump-
tions, such as type of emissions, allocation of emission allowances,
product and ﬁrm heterogeneity, among others (see: Balistreri and
Rutherford, 2012; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Winchester, 2012).
As has been said, other examinations have stressed the lim-
itations of these policy tools (Jakob et al., 2014). In general, it is
argued that addressing leakage in an effective manner requires
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products, but also about how world market prices would react to
the imposition of BCAs, and how this affects production and
consumption choices (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013). It has been
suggested, in this sense, that under incomplete information a full
BCA scheme (i.e. whereby a price is levied on imports according to
their carbon content and a rebate offered to exports to exempt
them from the domestic carbon price) could actually lead to an
increase in emissions and ultimately to a rise in leakage (Jakob
et al., 2013). This could be due to the decision by producers to
export their emission-intensive products to other unregulated
markets, or because production could shift from low-carbon-in-
tensive export sectors towards more carbon-intensive non-export
sectors.
In this paper we adhere to this latter perspective, since our
ﬁndings question the effectiveness of BCAs to address emissions
embodied in trade. The speciﬁc method and data that we used to
conduct our analysis is described next.3. Methods and data
Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) analysis is a widely used
technique to calculate emissions embodied in trade (see: Wied-
mann, 2009). This method is consequently employed in this paper
to estimate the volume of emissions that could be potentially
taxed by BCAs, and speciﬁcally to examine how their scope is af-
fected by trade provisions, assumptions on the carbon intensity of
imports, and sectoral and country coverage.
In standard input-output notation, total output (X) is given by
the following expression:
= ( − ) = ( )−X I A Y LY 11
where I is an identity matrix and A is the technical coefﬁcient
matrix. In the MRIO framework, matrix A accounts for sectoral
requirements within a region to produce goods domestically, as
well as inter-regional sectoral requirements to produce goods with
imported intermediate inputs. In this sense, A contains a domestic
component and an imports component. The term (IA)1 is
known as the Leontief inverse (further identiﬁed as L), which in-
dicates the requirements of a given sector to deliver a unit of
output. In turn, X and Y represent total output and ﬁnal demand,
respectively, of the sectors located in all regions. Regarding Y, it
incorporates all the components of ﬁnal demand (i.e. private and
public consumption, gross capital formation and change in in-
ventories) for domestically produced goods and services within a
region, as well as for imports. Moreover, goods and services pro-
duced domestically, but destined for ﬁnal consumption in other
regions (i.e. exports) are equally included in Y.
In order to determine the amount of emissions embodied in
products of intermediate and ﬁnal demand, the MRIO database
was reconﬁgured as an Emissions Embodied in Bilateral Trade
(EEBT) model (see: Peters, 2008). The main difference between
MRIO and EEBT is that in the latter the A matrix just includes the
domestic components, while intermediate exports are appended
as column vectors along with Y.
3.1. Estimating emissions embodied in trade ﬂows
Both MRIO and EEBT can be extended so as to include a row
vector of sectoral CO2 emissions. The emissions generated by
sector i are divided by the corresponding output (Xi) in order to
obtain a row vector of carbon intensities. These intensities can
then be expressed as a diagonal matrix (C^). In order to determine
the amount of emissions associated with a given level of output, C^is post-multiplied by X.
= ^ ( )C CX 2
By substituting X into the standard IO Eq. (1), this is equal to:
= ^ ( )C CLY 3
In this sense, the model is able to determine the amount of
direct and indirect CO2 emissions that are associated with a certain
level of ﬁnal demand (Y). The term C in the equation represents a
rectangular matrix of CO2 emissions, with i*s rows and i columns,
where i is the number of countries and s the number of sectors.
Expressed in compact form, the C matrix is constituted by do-
mestic and trade-related components. In the case of two regions,
m and n, this matrix is equal to:
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭= ( )C
c c
c c 4
mm mn
nm nn
where each component (c) in this matrix stands for a column
vector with an s number of rows. In this sense, cmm and cnn are the
emissions required to satisfy the domestic production of goods
consumed within regionsm and n, respectively. In turn, cmn are the
emissions necessary to manufacture products in m that are con-
sumed in n (i.e. exports from m to n). Accordingly, cnm are the
emissions required to produce goods in n that are consumed in m
(i.e. imports from n to m). The total sum of the rows in this matrix
(i.e. domestic plus exports) yields direct production emissions.
Conversely, the total sum of the columns (i.e. domestic plus im-
ports) represents consumption-based emissions. If region m
corresponds to a group of economies subject to legally-binding
emissions targets (i.e. Annex B nations), the column vector cnm
then represents the emissions embedded in their imports manu-
factured in region n, which could therefore be levied by a BCA
scheme. On the other hand, cmn stands for emissions already
priced that are embedded in products manufactured in regionm to
be consumed in n. These are the exports that can be subject to a
rebate.
BATs, on the other hand, were calculated as the average carbon
intensities (C^) of the 33% most carbon efﬁcient countries under the
scheme. Individual nations were ranked, once for every economic
sector, according to their intensities. BATs were then estimated as
the mean carbon intensity of the most efﬁcient tercile.
3.2. Estimating value added embodied in trade ﬂows
Value added is understood as the value that is added to a
product during each stage of its production process along the
global supply chain. Studies have emerged detailing the input–
output methods required to measure the amount of value added
that is embodied in traded goods and services (Daudin et al., 2011;
Hummels et al., 2001; IDE-JETRO and WTO, 2011). In this study,
trade in value added was calculated following the same procedure
as in the case of CO2 emissions.
A row vector of value added per sector is divided by the total
output of each sector. The resulting vector (V^ ) is then diagonalised.
In order to determine the amount of value added (V) that is gen-
erated directly and indirectly given a level of output, V^ is post-
multiplied by X.
= ^ = ^ ( )V VX VLY 5
Expressed in a compact form, V is a rectangular matrix com-
posed of domestic and traded components.
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭= ( )V
v v
v v 6
mm mn
nm nn
Fig. 1. Emissions embodied in exports and imports in Annex B nations. Approxi-
mately 5.3 Gt of CO2 were embodied in imports destined to Annex B nations in
2007, while 3.3 Gt were embodied in exports from Annex B to the rest of the world.
About 2.4 Gt of traded emissions were embodied in products traded within Annex
B nations and consequently are not subject to BCAs. The bars within the dotted
lines represent the emissions embodied in inter-regional trade ﬂows. These com-
prise 1.1 Gt or 31.5% of export emissions and 2.9 Gt or 54.8% of import emissions.
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elements (v) represents a column vector with s number of rows,
where s is the number of sectors. The vectors vmm and vnn indicate
the value added per sector that is generated within the regions to
satisfy domestic consumption. In turn, vmn is the value added
created within region m to produce exports consumed in region n.
The same logic applies to vnm.
3.3. Estimating tariff rates
The tariff rates faced by region n depend on the price for carbon
(p). In order to calculate the tariffs, p is multiplied by the amount
of emissions embedded in imports. This is then divided by the
value of those same imports, expressed in terms of their value
added. The tariff is calculated according to the following expres-
sion:
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠= ( )′
^
( )
−
p c vtariff
7
nm nm
1
where p is a scalar (i.e. price for carbon), (cnm)’ represents the
transposed vector of emissions embodied in imports and ( v^nm)1
is the inverse of the diagonalised values of those imports.
3.4. Data
The MRIO table was assembled with data from the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP), version 8 (Narayanan et al., 2012), con-
sisting of a large square transactions matrix that represents the
structure of the global economy. It includes 110 countries and 19
regions depicting the rest of the world, each encompassing 57
economic sectors. This matrix is accompanied by another one re-
presenting ﬁnal demand and an additional row vector for value
added. GTAP data for CO2 emissions was complemented with
ﬁgures taken from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC), comprising emissions derived from the use of solid and
liquid fuels, gas, and cement production. These data were in-
corporated into the model as a row vector following the sectoral
breakdown provided by GTAP.1 The Kyoto Protocol also details in its Annex A emissions from agriculture,
waste and deforestation, which have been central in international negotiations.
However, we have not taken these into account in our analysis, which represents a
limitation.4. Empirical results
Annex B countries generated around 45% of global emissions
from 2005 to 2010, but were accountable for a larger amount of
CO2 by consuming products manufactured in other regions (Davis
and Caldeira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011). Using data for 2007, we
estimated that approximately 5.3 Gt of CO2 (i.e. 17.9% of global)
were embodied in imports destined to Annex B nations, while
3.5 Gt (i.e. 11.8% of global) were embodied in exports to the rest of
the world. The net emissions transfer or deﬁcit (i.e. imports minus
exports) in Annex B nations thus amounted to about 1.8 Gt (i.e.
6.1% of global). As can be seen in Fig. 1, about 2.4 Gt of traded
emissions were embodied in intra-Annex B trade ﬂows and con-
sequently would not be included in a BCA scheme. It is only the
CO2 traded with non-Annex B nations that could be covered, as-
suming that both imports and exports were considered. The
emissions, represented in Fig. 1 as the bars within the dotted lines,
represent the volume of emissions that are embodied in inter-re-
gional trade ﬂows. This includes 1.1 Gt or 31.5% of the total export
emissions produced in Annex B, and 2.9 Gt or 54.8% of total import
emissions from Non-Annex B. It is worth mentioning that almost
half of imported emissions (1.3 Gt) correspond to China and al-
most another fourth (0.8 Gt) to the rest of the emerging economies
(see Table A.1 in the appendix).4.1. Trade regulations
The scope for BCAs is inﬂuenced by a number of factors, such as
trade law under the WTO framework. In order to comply with
GATT's provision of non-discrimination, and thus ensure that im-
ports receive a fair and similar treatment than domestic products,
not all types of imports can be levied. BCAs can only be applied to
comparable products that are covered domestically in the region
of consumption by the existing abatement scheme. In this manner,
17.0% (0.5 Gt) of the emissions embodied in imports cannot be
included under the existing provisions. These are associated with
sectors not currently considered in the Kyoto Protocol and the EU
ETS, and are therefore not priced (see Table A.2 in the appendix)1.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, only 2.4 Gt could be potentially taxed by
BCAs. We call this volume of emissions the hypothetical scope of
BCAs, which is illustrated in Fig. 2 as the bar within the dotted
lines.
GATT’s provision of non-discrimination also requires not taxing
imports in excess of the domestic rates, even if their carbon con-
tent is greater. It is assumed that non-Annex B nations would
defend this provision. This implies the application of carbon
equalisation measures, such as BAT. Imports are thus assumed to
have been manufactured with at least the best clean technology
existent in the region of consumption. The determination of an
appropriate BAT is, however, complicated. It has been suggested
that product-speciﬁc benchmarks should be used, like the ones
developed in the EU ETS for industry products (Monjon and
Quirion, 2010). In the case of this analysis, BATs were calculated for
each economic sector as the average carbon intensity of the most
carbon-efﬁcient tercile of countries under the scheme. As illu-
strated in Fig. 2, the scheme's breadth decreases signiﬁcantly
when BATs are applied. They cause a reduction of 1.3 Gt or 55.8% of
the hypothetical scope. This evidences, on the one hand, the high
carbon intensities of some non-Annex B nations and, on the other,
the undermining effects that BATs could have on the effectiveness
of BCAs.
Fig. 2. Decomposition of the hypothetical scope. 17.0% of emissions embodied in
imports from Non-Annex B are not priced domestically and cannot be levied. BATs
cause a reduction of 55.8% of the hypothetical scope. Excluding activities that
contribute with less than 5% of total imports in a given sector reduces the scope by
19.1%. Excluding LDCs causes a minimal impact. The volume that could be taxed
amounts to 22.9% of the hypothetical scope. Two thirds correspond to priced sec-
tors, including those that are exposed to foreign competition. The remaining third
is related to electricity. Around 69.8% of these emissions are associated with in-
termediate inputs, while the rest relates to products for ﬁnal demand.
Table 1
Average tariff rates on imports at $50 USD per ton.
Coverage China India Emerging
economies
Other high
income
LDCs
All sectors 11.1% 7.8% 4.7% 3.2% 2.9%
Only priced sectors (hy-
pothetical scope)
15.0% 19.4% 6.4% 5.1% 4.9%
With BAT 2.1% 3.6% 2.4% 4.2% 3.3%
With BAT and 5% criterion 2.1% 3.4% 1.8% 3.0% 1.2%
With BAT and 5% criterion
and excluding
electricity
1.2% 2.2% 1.5% 2.7% 1.1%
M. Sakai, J. Barrett / Energy Policy 92 (2016) 102–110 1074.2. Country and sectoral coverage
Country and sectoral exemptions constitute one more factor
that can inﬂuence the scope of BCAs. There have been proposals to
exclude those activities that contribute with less than 5% of the
total imports in a given sector of the consuming country or region
(Cosbey et al., 2012; van Asselt and Brewer, 2010). Exempting
sectors based on the 5% criterion reduces the amount of captured
emissions by approximately 0.4 Gt or 19.1% of the hypothetical
scope.
Certain proposals, such as the ones initiated in the US, also
contemplate exempting least developed countries (LDCs), as long
as they are responsible individually for less than 0.5% of global CO2
(Monjon and Quirion, 2010; Winchester et al., 2011). It is assumed
that these economies do not represent a risk of leakage and loss of
competitiveness. As is shown in Fig. 2, the implications of ex-
cluding LDCs are minimal. The CO2 captured from these nations
amounts to barely 0.5% of total emissions in Annex B countries.
The volume of CO2 that could be potentially taxed after taking
into consideration trade provisions and country and sectoral ex-
emptions thus amounts to 0.56 Gt, about 22.9% of the hypothetical
scope and barely 1.8% of global emissions. Around two thirds of
these (0.37 Gt) correspond to sectors priced by the Kyoto Protocol
and the EU ETS, including six that are characterised by being
carbon intensive and exposed to foreign competition (i.e. lime and
cement, basic iron and steel, reﬁned petroleum, aluminium, in-
organic basic chemicals, and pulp and paper). The latter are con-
sidered as particularly relevant in terms of competitiveness and
carbon leakage, and represent the sectors that are most likely to be
taxed by future BCA schemes (Stephenson and Upton, 2009).
However, just focusing on these last sectors would imply capturing
0.28 Gt or 11.5% of the hypothetical scope (i.e. 0.9% of global
emissions).
In turn, a third of the emissions that could be potentially taxed
(i.e. 0.19 Gt or 7.7% of the hypothetical scope) relate to the on- and
off-site generation of electricity used to manufacture the products
that are consumed. Electricity is not always traded between
countries, but it is embedded into them during production. In-
cluding electricity can be challenging, as it would require calcu-
lating the direct and indirect electricity contributions along the
global supply chain.Finally, tracking the emissions associated with ﬁnal and inter-
mediate products poses a similar problem. The results reveal that
around 69.8% of emissions from priced sectors are associated with
intermediate inputs, while the rest is embodied in products for
ﬁnal demand. A precise estimation of the emissions generated
along the global supply chain to produce ﬁnal goods can be a
daunting task that would elevate the complexity and the operating
costs of a BCA scheme, as will be discussed.
4.3. Average tariff rates
Table 1 shows the average tariff rates faced by different coun-
tries and regions based on an illustrative carbon price of $50 USD
per ton, ﬁnding that they are mostly consistent with those esti-
mated previously by Atkinson et al. (2011). If all sectors were
taxed, regardless of their treatment by the existing emissions
trading schemes, China and India would face average rates of
around 11.1% and 7.8% due to their high carbon intensities (see
Table A.3 in the appendix). In turn, emerging economies and other
high-income nations with no binding targets would face average
rates of 4.7% and 3.2%, respectively. Nonetheless, the tariffs would
increase if only the priced sectors were taken into account (i.e.
hypothetical scope), since these are more intensive in carbon.
China and India would face taxes of 15.0% and 19.4%, respectively,
while these would vary from 6.4% to 4.9% in the other country
groups. The use of BATs, however, drastically reduces the burdens,
with tariffs ranging between 4.2% and 2.1% among different na-
tions. This measure would particularly favour China, who would
observe an 85% decline in its tariff with respect to the hypothetical
scope, the lowest rates among the country groups. The inclusion of
the 5% criterion, in turn, has a minor effect, but it would speciﬁ-
cally beneﬁt LDCs by halving their tariffs with respect to the option
that only includes BAT. Excluding electricity also produces a sig-
niﬁcant effect in relation to the most carbon intensive economies,
especially in the case of China, whose tariff would drop to about
1.2%. India would equally register an important reduction, facing a
tariff 2.2%. The inﬂuence of electricity is less striking in the rest of
the country groups and has a very small effect in LDCs.5. Discussion
The results presented in the previous section evidence the
challenges involved in the implementation of BCAs. Some of the
issues analysed here contribute to substantially diminish the
breadth of these policy tools, and thus to reduce the tariffs faced
by the major non-priced polluting economies. Trade provisions,
and especially the use of BATs, undermine the tariff rates. Low
tariffs would hardly level the playing ﬁeld between nations and
would do little to alleviate competitiveness concerns among do-
mestic producers who are subject to a carbon price. Moreover, low
rates weaken the incentive for foreign carbon-intensive exporters
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Our ﬁndings contradict those obtained by other authors who
suggest that BATs might not necessarily cause an increase in car-
bon leakage (Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Monjon and Quirion,
2011b). According to the calculations offered in this paper, coun-
tries like China and India could register decreases in their BCA
rates of up to 85% due to BAT. We argue that tariffs of 2% to 4%,
based on carbon price of $50 USD per ton, could not be enough to
protect domestic industries from foreign competition and, more
importantly, to halt the increasing transfer of emissions from non-
priced to priced economies. Furthermore, rates of this calibre
would offer very limited support to curb global emissions, as has
been insinuated by other studies (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010).
The developing world, however, would certainly offer less re-
sistance to some trade provisions, like the proposal to exclude
those activities that contribute with less than 5% of the total im-
ports in a given sector of the consuming country. Likewise, LDCs
would welcome being totally exempted from any BCA scheme.
These two factors, the 5% criterion and the exclusion of LDCs, could
lead to reductions of about 19.1% and 2.2%, respectively, of the
emissions captured by BCAs (i.e. the hypothetical scope). However,
they would particularly favour the smallest and weakest econo-
mies, as well as low-carbon and not highly trade-exposed eco-
nomic sectors located in more afﬂuent nations. These provisions
could be implemented on grounds of ensuring fairness and
avoiding shifting the mitigation burden to the most unprotected
countries and sectors. Meanwhile, these measures would have
limited inﬂuence on the tariffs faced by highly carbon-intensive
and export-oriented emerging economies, like China, India and
South Africa, to whom these provisions have little effect.
The results also corroborate the difﬁculty of addressing the
complexity of the global supply chains in terms of fully capturing
the carbon embodied in products along the different stages of the
production process (Izard et al., 2010). The exclusion of electricity
exerts an important effect on the volume of captured emissions
and thus on the reduction of leakage. Estimating the speciﬁc
emissions contributed by electricity use can be technically com-
plicated, particularly when integrated electricity systems are in-
volved, as the origin of speciﬁc electricity inputs is difﬁcult to track
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). However, the effectiveness of a BCA
scheme would be weakened if electricity was not taken into ac-
count, especially for electricity-intensive sectors that are exposed
to international competition, such as aluminium (Monjon and
Quirion, 2010). The ﬁndings presented here indicate that elec-
tricity accounts for around a third of the emissions which could be
potentially taxed (i.e. 7.7% of the hypothetical scope), after con-
sidering the reductions caused by trade provisions. Failing to
capture this volume would lead to important reductions in tariff
rates, especially in the case of those countries, like China, who
have beneﬁted heavily by using low-cost, but high-carbon sources
for power generation. China, India and the rest of the emerging
economies would face tariffs as low as 1.2%, 2.2% and 1.5%, re-
spectively, hardly high enough to level the playing ﬁeld.
A similar problem comes to the fore when estimating the
amount and origin of emissions that are embodied in products.
This task can be simpler in the case of intensive primary com-
modities, but it can become a challenging undertaking with re-
gards to more elaborate products, such as electronic or mechanical
components. In the case of ﬁnal demand goods, such as cars or
heavy equipment, the complexity is even greater. Calculating the
direct and indirect emissions of elaborate or ﬁnal products re-
quires a comprehensive and transparent carbon accounting pro-
cedure that takes into account the intricacy of global supply
chains. The results show that by just covering basic commodities
and intermediates, BCAs could capture around 10.5% of emissions
included in the hypothetical scope without considering electricity,while a further 4.5% could be lost by not capturing all the emis-
sions embodied in ﬁnal demand goods. Doing so, however, is dif-
ﬁcult and costly. For example, requiring exporters to provide cer-
tiﬁed information about the carbon embodied in their goods can
imply a heavy burden, especially for small producers. Applying a
rigid rate, on the other hand, could be considered as a ﬁxed import
or anti-dumping tariff, irresponsive to improvements in carbon
intensity (Winchester, 2012). This ﬁxed rate could reduce the ef-
fectiveness of the tax in encouraging producers to modify their
practices, unless it is considered as a fall-back rate and importers
can choose to provide evidence about the speciﬁc carbon content
of their products.
The low tariffs estimated here, nonetheless, could be less da-
maging to the developing world, but there is still the risk that they
could prove be trade-distorting and could create adverse dis-
tributional impacts in terms of welfare in net exporting countries,
as has been suggested in the literature (Atkinson et al., 2011;
Dissou and Eyland, 2011). BCAs levied by industrialised countries
generally change the terms-of-trade against the developing world,
thereby shifting the burden of emission abatement and exacer-
bating existing income inequalities (Böhringer et al., 2012). These
effects could be ameliorated by abandoning free allowance allo-
cation or given that the revenues obtained from the schemes were
remitted back to the exporting nations in the form of aid, tech-
nology transfer or assistance for adaptation efforts (Böhringer
et al., 2012; Steininger et al., 2014). However, even if these low
tariffs could be imposed, they might still be a cause of opposition
from non-priced economies, mainly on grounds of contravening
the spirit of free trade.
In environmental terms, the contribution of BCAs is minimal. It
is uncertain if tariffs as low as those determined in this paper
could still maintain some coercive power. It can be assumed that
they would be too weak to stimulate unregulated economies to
strengthen their mitigation efforts. Rather, they could represent a
cause of trade disputes and could deepen the stalemate in inter-
national climate negotiations. Furthermore, it has been recognised
that taxing one unit of imported emissions is not always equal to
avoiding the release of one unit of emissions to the atmosphere
(Jakob et al., 2014). Even if it were technically and politically
possible to calculate the exact amount of emissions released in the
production of imports and a corresponding carbon price could be
applied, it is inconclusive if BCAs can contribute to reduce emis-
sions on a global scale. It is argued, however, that combining BCAs
with full auctioning could deliver added beneﬁts for mitigation
(Sato et al., 2015).6. Conclusions and policy implications
Given the increasing net emissions transfers from non-carbon-
priced to carbon-priced economies via international trade, some
countries have considered extending emission pricing in a uni-
lateral manner to cover imported goods and services by applying
BCAs. It is argued that this course of action could level the playing
ﬁeld between nations and reduce carbon leakage. The objective of
this paper is to quantify the volume of emissions that could be
actually levied by BCAs, and determine how the tariff burdens
faced by non-carbon-priced economies are shaped by issues re-
lated to trade provisions, carbon intensity of products, and sectoral
and country coverage. In summary, it can be concluded that BCAs
could prove to be complex, costly and ineffectual policy tools,
which complements and conﬁrms other similar existing ﬁndings
in the literature (Izard et al., 2010; Liu, 2015; McKibbin et al., 2008;
Winchester et al., 2011). This paper makes a contribution by esti-
mating that trade provisions substantially reduce the volume of
emissions that could be potentially taxed and contribute to
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mies. The implementation of BAT more than halves the scope of
captured emissions, while the tariffs faced by high carbon-in-
tensive countries, like China, could drop by around 85%. Further-
more, proposals to exclude activities that contribute with less than
5% of the total imports in a given sector of the consuming country
can cause a further reduction of about 19.1% of the initial scope.
Failing to capture the complexity of global supply chains also has
important effects. Not including the full contribution of electricity
to the production process and only focusing on levying intensive
primary commodities and intermediates can cause added reduc-
tions of 12.3%. After taking into account all these issues, countries
like China and India could end facing tariffs of around 1.2% and
2.2%. Tariffs as low as these ones would do little to protect do-
mestic industries from foreign competition and stop the increase
in carbon leakage.
It can be concluded that BCAs are not optimal policy tools. This
statement supports similar claims made, for example, by Jakob
et al. (2014), who assert that putting a price on an externality
equal to its social costs via BCAs is not an adequate measure for
emissions embodied in imports. This has important policy im-
plications, especially for nations like the US, who has stated that
any future climate legislation involving reduction targets would
contain a provision for BCAs to protect its national industries. The
Kerry-Lieberman and the Waxman-Markey climate bills, which
failed to obtain approval by the US congress, considered the use of
these policy instruments. In the light of the results presented in
this paper, we argue that US policy makers should seek other more
effective strategies if they intend to alleviate their carbon leakage
concerns.
The latest UN climate summit in Paris constituted an important
effort towards engaging developed and developing nations in
limiting the global average temperature to below 2 degrees with
respect to the pre-industrial era before the end of the century
(UNFCCC, 2015). Nonetheless, the world is still far from achieving a
true universal climate agreement that includes an internationally
harmonised price on carbon, as well as setting legally binding
targets for all major polluters. If this was attained, then carbon
leakage and competiveness would cease being considered as is-
sues of concern. Presently, the implementation of emissions
trading schemes in Non-Annex B nations constitutes good news.
The case of the Chinese scheme is of particular relevance, since a
considerable share of global emissions would thus be covered and
priced. This could represent up to an additional 25% according to
the ﬁgures used in this analysis, but subject to the breadth of
sectoral coverage that is considered. This would also mean that up
to half of Annex B imported emissions could be priced, as has been
discussed in Section 4. The operation of additional abating
schemes, such as the Korean and Chinese programmes, however,
does not undermine the relevance of this paper's ﬁndings. Carbon
leakage and competitiveness would still represent matters of
concern between carbon-priced and non-carbon-priced econo-
mies, and issues like trade provisions and country and sectoral
coverage would continue affecting the volume of captured emis-
sions and the tariffs faced by importing nations.
Given the inefﬁciency of BCAs, alternative options should be
sought if leakage concerns are wished to be addressed. The lit-
erature offers examples of measures that can prove to be more
efﬁcient to deal with emissions transfers and which can support
global emissions reductions. It has been recognised that there is
not a magic bullet that can solve these issues on its own, but rather
a mix of different policies could prove to be more optimal. Some
authors have suggested that if a BCA scheme were to be im-
plemented, it would need to cover just a few trade-exposed and
carbon-intensive commodities (Droege, 2011; Lininger, 2015). In
addition, it would require close international cooperation to createtrust and avoid disputes and harmful outcomes (Neuhoff, 2011).
This could be also combined with state aid to sensitive sectors
(domestic and foreign). Moreover, full auctioning of allowances
would be mandated (Sato et al., 2015) or continuing with free al-
location in the case of emission-intensive industries, but based on
output levels, as has been suggested by some scholars (Jakob et al.,
2014; Monjon and Quirion, 2011a). Lastly, emissions could be
partially levelled by a wider implementation of carbon offset po-
licies, such as the Clean Development Mechanism, which are more
cost effective than BCAs and provide direct incentives for emis-
sions reductions abroad (Böhringer et al., 2012; Jakob et al., 2014).
However, future research should evaluate a broader portfolio of
measures and assess their relative performance in terms of climate
and energy policies. This is vital to ensure a more equitable, fair
and swifter transition towards a low-carbon future.Acknowledgements
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